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Abstract
This paper proposes a new measure of skill mismatch to be applied to the recent OECD
Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC). The measure is derived from a formal theory and
combines information about skill proficiency, self-reported mismatch and skill use. The
theoretical foundations underling this measure allow identifying minimum and
maximum skill requirements for each occupation and to classify workers into three
groups: the well-matched, the under-skilled and the over-skilled. The availability of skill
use data further permits the computation of the degree of under- and over-usage of
skills in the economy. The empirical analysis is carried out using the first round of the
PIAAC data, allowing comparisons across skill domains, labour market statuses and
countries.
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1 Introduction
A large number of studies investigate the nature and consequences of mismatch, gener-
ally defined as some sort of discrepancy between the characteristics of employed workers
and the requirements of the jobs that they occupy (Quintini 2011a). For example, several
papers compare the formal education qualifications held by employed workers with the
requirements of their jobs, commonly finding large numbers of workers being more qual-
ified than necessary (Chevalier 2003; Dolton and Vignoles 2000; Groot and Maassen van
den Brink 2000; Quintini 2011b; Rubb 2003; Sicherman 1991; Sloane et al. 1999). This
finding can be rationalized by arguing, for example, that over-qualified workers may not
have benefited from formal education as much as they could have and that their actual
competencies are less advanced than those one would normally expect them to possess
based on their formal educational qualifications. At the same time, workers who are found
to be under-qualified for their jobs may have acquired the necessary skills to perform sat-
isfactorily outside formal schooling, through experience, on-the-job learning and adult
education (Green and McIntosh 2007; Chevalier and Lindley 2009). Hence, it is inter-
esting to contrast qualification mismatch with skill mismatch, namely the discrepancy
between the skills possessed by a workers and those required to perform his/her job (Allen
and van der Velden 2001; Desjardins and Rubenson 2011). Over-skilled workers are those
who are more skilled than required by their jobs, the opposite for under-skilled workers.
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Unfortunately, measuring skill mismatch is particularly challenging, mostly due to the
lack of direct information about workers’ skills and job requirements. A large literature
has now emerged proposing various methodologies to measure mismatch in skills (Allen
and van der Velden 2001; Green and McIntosh 2007; Quintini 2011a; Flisi et al. 2014;
Desjardins and Rubenson 2011; CEDEFOP 2010; van der Velden and Bijlsma 2016) and
the comparison and assessment of these many methodologies is the subject of a some-
times heated debate, centred around the definition of the skill requirements of jobs or the
appropriateness of direct comparisons between skill endowments and skill use (Levels
et al. 2013). Our view of this debate is that it suffers from a serious lack of theory. The
typical paper in this area addresses the measurement problem without really providing a
formal definition of the underlying theoretical notion that is meant to be measured, thus
making it very difficult to compare the many proposed indicators. In most cases, they
simply measure different underlying concepts.
In this paper, we develop a simple theory that guides our use of the data from OECD
Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) to construct a new indicator of mismatch. Our model is
closely anchored to the specific data that we use and cannot be seen as a general theory of
mismatch. Nevertheless, the approach to measurement of skill mismatch that we derive
can be easily generalized to any other dataset sharing the same key features.
The OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) includes a rich battery of questions on skill
use at work and direct indicators of workers’ skill proficiency derived from a purposely
designed assessment exercise. The survey covers a large number of countries and guar-
antees a high degree of comparability across borders thanks to the harmonized sampling
procedures and the common questionnaire (OECD 2013a).1
In summary, the proposed methodology uses the simple theoretical framework to over-
come the fundamental problem of defining the skill requirements of jobs from a survey
of workers. Specifically, for each available skill domain and each occupation, minimum
and maximum requirements are defined as the minimum and the maximum proficiency
of self-reported well-matched workers.2 Within this framework, workers are classified as
well-matched in a skill domain if their proficiency score in that domain is between the
minimum and maximum requirements of her occupation. Workers are over-skilled or
under-skilled in a domain if their score is above the maximum or below the minimum
requirement.
Three additional features of the approach described in this paper are worth mention-
ing. First, alternative measures of the minimum and maximum skill requirements can
be produced by comparing the extremes of the distributions of assessed competencies
for the under- and over-skilled and the well-matched. Such comparison allows assess-
ing the relevance of misreporting in the estimated requirements. Second, exploiting the
rich background questionnaire of the PIAAC survey, it is possible to compare the uti-
lization of skills in the workplace by similarly proficient workers who are well-matched
or mismatched in their jobs, thus constructing indicators of the degree of under- and
over-utilization of skills associated with mismatch. Finally, our approach allows designing
simple reassignment algorithms that, far from solving the problem of optimally allocat-
ing workers to jobs, can be used to compare the distribution of skill mismatch across
alternative allocations and thus measure their relative efficiency.
In addition, we also develop a general procedure to construct standard errors for esti-
mates of skill-mismatch derived from surveys like PIAAC, where the sampling frames can
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differ substantially across countries and where the test scores are derived from imputa-
tion models. Such a procedure can be computationally intense, but it is very general and
it can be easily applied to any non-linear estimator constructed with the PIAAC data. The
procedure is described in the Appendix.
The results of our analysis show that on average, across the entire survey, approxi-
mately 75% of dependent employees are well-matched in the literacy domain, about 9%
are under-skilled and 16% are over-skilled. The overlap between literacy and numeracy
mismatch is substantial: 90% of the workers who are well-matched in literacy are also
well-matched in numeracy. Men are more likely to be over-skilled than women, whereas
gender differences in under-skilling are minor. Tertiary graduates are less likely to be
under-skilled than less educated workers, and they are also more likely to be over-skilled.
Foreign workers are more than twice more likely to be under-skilled than natives and sub-
stantially less likely to be over-skilled. Differences emerge also when looking across age
groups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises the rele-
vant literature. Section 3 lays out the proposed methodology to measure skill mismatch,
starting from its theoretical underpinnings and including a discussion of the empirical
implementation and of the impact of misreporting. Section 4 briefly describes the PIAAC
data and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 5 reports comparable estimates
of skill mismatch and skill under- and over-utilization across the countries covered in
PIAAC, for the entire population and for various subgroups. Section 6 presents an exten-
sion of the approach to construct measures of the over- and under-utilization of workers’
skills. Section 7 compares the distribution of skill mismatch observed in the data with
those resulting from a variety of reassignment procedures. Finally, Section 8 concludes by
highlighting the importance of this analysis for both academic research and policy making.
2 Measuringmismatch: a brief review of the literature
The term mismatch is often used to refer to rather different concepts in economics, thus
creating a certain confusion in an area that is attracting more and more policy attention
and that, therefore, would benefit a lot frommore accurate definitions and measurement.
It is useful to distinguish two broad notions of mismatch, a macro and a micro one. In
this paper, we focus on the latter, but to avoid confusion, it is important to mention that
it also exists a macro concept of mismatch that is common to a rich strand of studies
(Jovanovic 1979; Farber 1999; Robin et al. 2009; Sattinger 1993). In very general terms,
in models with heterogeneous jobs and workers, aggregate mismatch is defined as the
existence of an allocation of workers to jobs that could improve the realized equilibrium
in terms of either employment levels or output. For example, vacancies and jobseekers
could be heterogeneous in their locations andmismatch would be present when reallocat-
ing them across locations could improve the efficiency of matching (Shimer 2007; S¸ahin
et al. 2012). The same definition could be applied to other (or multiple) dimensions of
heterogeneity, such as workers’ skills and jobs’ requirements. A somewhat dated but still
very valid review of models in this area is provided by (Sattinger 1993), who labels them
assignment models. Regardless of the nature of the heterogeneity, the aggregate notion
of mismatch is a feature of the joint distribution of workers’ and jobs’ characteristics and,
as such, it is an intrinsically macro concept. In this perspective, it is impossible to say
whether a single job-worker pair is a mismatch in isolation from the others.
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The micro notion of mismatch is very different, as it really refers to each single pair
of workers and jobs. Unfortunately, the theoretical foundations of such micro concept
are much less clear than for its macro analogue. The entire literature on qualification
and skill mismatch, which clearly refers to the micro notion, is exclusively empirical and
various measurements have been proposed, but in the absence of a formal definition, it is
extremely difficult to compare them and assess their advantages and disadvantages.
In very general terms, skill (or qualification) mismatch is constructed by compar-
ing the skills (or qualifications) of an employed worker with the skill (or qualification)
requirements of her job (hence, the non-employed and the vacant jobs are completely dis-
regarded). Then, any given job-worker pair can be classified as a good match if the skills
(or qualifications) of the employee are compatible with the requirements of the job. If
the worker is more skilled (or qualified) than required, she is classified as over-skilled (or
over-qualified) and under-skilled (or under-qualified) in the opposite case.
This measurement exercise is usually carried out using data collected from surveys of
workers, so that direct information on the demand side is lacking and the job require-
ments need to be inferred. Various approached have been proposed to address this
problem.
Regarding qualification mismatch, many surveys now include questions on the educa-
tional qualifications required by the employer for the job occupied by the respondent. The
question may ask about the current requirements or those at the time when the person
was hired (or both). This is a reasonable approach but, given that skills are acquired (or
lost) also outside formal schooling, under-qualified workers may have acquired the neces-
sary skills to carry out their jobs through experience or training. Similarly, over-qualified
workers may have failed to acquire skills in school or may have lost them over time.
Figure 1 illustrates some of the problems associated with measures of mismatch based
on educational qualifications. The figure reports the distributions of numeracy skills—as
measured in PIAAC (see Section 4 for more information about the data)—for two groups
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Fig. 1 Numeracy of over-qualified graduates
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and those employed in jobs that do not require a graduate degree (the over-qualified).3
The distribution of the over-qualified is clearly shifted to the left, indicating that these
workers have lower numeracy scores than the well-matched (results for literacy are very
similar). One possible interpretation of this result is that the reason why some graduates
end up in jobs that do not require a graduate degree is that their skills are not exactly
those that one would expect from someone who has attended college.
There are many possible explanations for this phenomenon. For example, for some
people, the investment in tertiary education might not have been particularly successful
or they could have been particularly unlucky and found jobs that did not contribute to
maintaining and developing their competencies. There could even be an issue of reverse
causality, as graduates employed in non-graduate jobs may see their skills deteriorate
rapidly. Whatever the reasons underlying the result in Fig. 1, it is clear that an indica-
tor of mismatch based on direct measures of skills would provide a much more precise
description of the phenomenon.
For these reasons, skill mismatch is commonly regarded as a more informative indicator
and several studies measure it using data with direct information on workers’ skill profi-
ciency. A variety of techniques to identify the skill requirements of the jobs can be found
in the literature. One approach makes use of information from surveys asking employed
workers whether they have the skills to do a more demanding job than the one they cur-
rently do or whether they feel the need of additional training to carry out their job tasks
satisfactorily (Allen and van der Velden 2001; Green and McIntosh 2007). Unfortunately,
answers to such questions are likely subject to various forms of misreporting, the most
obvious being people’s overconfidence.
Alternative approaches can be implemented when data on actual skill proficiency and
skill usage are available, as in a number of datasets like PIAAC, IALS, TIMMs, PIRLS,
ALL and a number of national surveys.4 For example, using these data, one can compare
individual proficiency with the average or the median in the occupation and classify as
over-(under-)skilled those workers whose skills are significantly (usually one or two stan-
dard deviations) above (below) the centrality measure (Quintini 2011a; Flisi et al. 2014;
Montt 2016).
When information on both proficiency and skill use is available, the two can also be
compared directly, thus considering over-skilled those workers who do not make full use
of their competencies on the job (Desjardins and Rubenson 2011; CEDEFOP 2010). Such
an alternative approach is also subject to a number of serious problems. First of all, it
implicitly assumes that skill use, which is either self-reported by the worker or derived
from occupational titles, can be interpreted as a measure of job requirements, whereas
it rather is the outcome of both the matching process and endogenous effort choices.
Second, proficiency and use are very different theoretical concepts, and they can hardly
be represented along the samemetrics. In fact, they are derived from structurally different
pieces of information: indicators of skill use normally exploit survey questions about the
frequency (and/or the importance) with which specific tasks are carried out in a certain
job, whereas skill proficiency is usually measured through cognitive tests.5
The methodology proposed in this paper is meant to address these difficult issues, and
it rests on a very simple theoretical framework that allows us to formally define mismatch
and to provide guidance about its empirical implementation. Obviously, our new indica-
tor also suffers from various important limitations that will be discussed at length in the
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next section. For example, it does still use self-reported information by the workers, but
it does so in a way that reduces the potential distortions induced by overconfidence or by
misinterpretations of the need for training. Our indicator does not use the median skill
in an occupation to define job requirements; however, we still use some moments of the
distribution of skills within occupations to define them. Our indicator does not require
making direct comparisons between measured skill proficiency and skill use, but we do
need to impose strong assumptions about the process of skill deployment. Overall, we
believe that our indicator improves on the existing ones in many dimensions, but we do
acknowledge that it is also subject to a number of important limitations.
3 Deriving theOECDmeasure of skill mismatch
The micro version of skill mismatch considered in this paper is a feature of the single job-
worker pair, and it measures whether the skills possessed by the worker are adequate to
carry out the tasks required by the job. A worker whose skills are below the level required
by the job is classified as under-skilled, a worker whose skills are above those required by
the job is classified as over-skilled.
The key difficulty in formalizing the notion of skill mismatch concerns the identifica-
tion of the job requirements, as most of the times, the data used for this type of analysis
are collected through surveys of workers and do not contain direct information on the
structure of the production process.
In this section, we develop a simple theoretical framework that is helpful to define job
requirements more formally and to spell out explicitly the assumptions imposed on the
data to estimate them. One crucial feature of the theory is the treatment of skill use as
an endogenous choice of the worker, similar to the choice of effort in standard principal-
agent models. By explicitly modelling the choice to deploy skills, our model provides
guidance not only for the measurement of skill mismatch but also for the interpretation
of the questions regarding the use of skills at work. We see this as an important contribu-
tion because, as we discuss more in details in Section 6, it allows constructing meaningful
indicators of the degree of skill under-utilization or over-utilization that can be associ-
ated with over- and under-skilling. In the absence of some theoretical guidance about skill
deployment, it would be very difficult to link empirical measures of skill endowment and
skill use.
It is also worth emphasizing that the theoretical framework described in this section
serves the simple purpose of providing guidance to the measurement of skill mismatch
with the empirical variables available in PIAAC (see Section 4 for a description of
the data). Hence, it is very limited in two dimensions. First, it does not aim at for-
malising an explanation for the existence of mismatch as an equilibrium outcome. A
direct implication of this first limitation is that the model assumes an existing alloca-
tion of workers to jobs and discusses how the degree of mismatch in such allocation
could be measured. The model does not attempt to explain why such an allocation
might be observed. In this sense, our theoretical exercise is very different from the
so-called assignment models that instead focus specifically on the process by which
workers and jobs are matched to one another (Sattinger 1993). Of course, there is a
connection between our theory and the assignment models because the efficiency of
the assignment process determines the degree of mismatch in the resulting allocation
of workers to jobs. Hence, one can view our exercise as complementary to (some)
Pellizzari and Fichen IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2017) 6:1 Page 7 of 30
assignment models, as we provide an approach to measuring their efficiency with some
real data.6
The second limitation is that our model is specifically designed to be implemented with
the PIAAC data and it cannot be seen as a general theory of mismatch measurement.
It should however be noticed also that our methodology can presumably be applied to
any dataset where direct indicators of skills are available, together with the more com-
mon information on employment status and occupations. There are now many datasets
in which this type of information is available, such as IALS and ALL, the predecessors of
PIAAC, but also TIMMS, PIRLS, and a number of national skill surveys (e.g. UK Employer
Skill Survey).
Despite these limitations, we believe that our theory still constitutes a nice contribution
to the literature, at a minimum because it allows making explicit the assumptions under-
lying the proposed measure of skill mismatch. Other indicators of skill mismatch that
have been used in the literature are obviously also based on a number of assumptions, but
these are rarely made explicit and are often more restrictive than the ones discussed here.
For example, the assumption that jobs are homogeneous within occupations or that the
production function is kinked are common to virtually all studies.
3.1 Theoretical foundations
For presentational ease, the model in this section rests on a number of simplifying
assumptions, many of which can be relaxed without affecting the qualitative implications
of the theory in a major way (see Section 3.5).
Building blocks. Consider an economy with heterogeneous workers and heteroge-
neous jobs.Workers, indexed by i, differ in their endowment of skills, labelled ηi, and they
endogenously decide howmuch skills to deploy in their jobs. For simplicity, ηi is assumed
to be a simple uni-dimensional skill, and Section 3.5 discusses how this framework can be
extended to multiple skills.7
Deploying skills is costless within the limit of one’s endowment, and it is subject to a
constant marginal cost for any skill level beyond one’s endowment, as in Fig. 2. In other
words, workers are allowed to deploy a level of skills that goes beyond their endowments
provided they pay a utility cost. This is necessary in order to rationalize the existence of
under-skilled workers in the economy.
Fig. 2 The cost of deploying skills
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Jobs are defined as production functions, with skills being the only input. Each job
employs one worker and is independent of other jobs. Different jobs have different pro-
duction functions, which are characterized by three key features: (i) local linearity, (ii)
fixed operational costs and (iii) discontinuously declining marginal productivity.
More specifically, assume that output yij of job j filled with worker i is a function of the
amount of skills that the worker endogenously chooses to deploy on the job, si. Further,
assume that there are fixed costs kj to operate the job and that the marginal product of
deployed skills is locally constant and decreases above a certain threshold. For simplicity,
we will assume that the marginal product of skills is equal to zero beyond such threshold.
Under this set of assumptions, the production function for a generic job looks as in Fig. 3.
The combination of the fixed costs and the discontinuously declining marginal product
generates two critical values in the distributions of skills that lead to a very natural def-
inition of skill mismatch. Workers with skill endowments below minj are under-skilled,
workers with skill endowments between minj and maxj are well-matched and workers
with skill endowments abovemaxj are over-skilled.
We do not allow firms to change their production technologies. In particular, they can-
not adapt the technological characteristics of the job to the skill composition of available
workers nor to the skills of the specific workers they are matched with. Of course, if
such adjustment could take place frictionlessly and instantaneously, no mismatch would
be observed in equilibrium. More reasonably, it is plausible to assume that some fric-
tions exist preventing immediate and costless technological adaptation. In this model, we
take this assumption to the extreme and impose that the parameters of the production
function are fixed. As a consequence, the skill mismatch that we measure should be inter-
preted as a short-run phenomenon that could disappear over time if employers adjust the
requirements of their jobs to the skills of their employees.
Workers are assigned to jobs according to some assignment mechanism that we
do not model and, conditional on the characteristics of their jobs, they choose
Fig. 3 The production function
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how much of their skills to deploy in order to maximize the following utility
function:
Uij = wij − 1(yij < 0)F − ci(si) (1)
where wij is the wage worker i paid in job j, F is a utility cost associated with producing
negative output (e.g. the cost of being fired and suffering a spell of unemployment) and
ci(si) is the cost of deploying skills (Fig. 2):8
ci =
{
0 if s ≤ ηi
δsi if s > ηi
(2)
with δ ≥ 0.
Assume wages are proportional to productivity:9
wij = γiyij (3)
where for simplicity, γi is allowed to vary only across workers and output is defined as10
yij =
{
βjsi − kj if si ≤ minj
βjmaxj − kj if si > maxj (4)
with βj ≥ 0 and kj ≥ 0 for all j.
Optimal skill deployment. Consider the following three cases.
1. Worker i is a good skill match with job j, i.e.minj ≤ ηi ≤ maxj. Given the above
assumptions, workers in this condition would obviously find it optimal to deploy
their entire endowment of skills on the job, s∗i = ηi.
2. Worker i is under-skilled for job j, i.e. ηi < minj. Assuming that F is large enough
to make the decision to deploy skills belowminj always suboptimal, under-skilled
workers choose to deploy the minimum level of skills that allows them not to incur
in the cost F : s∗i = minj.
3. Worker i is over-skilled for job j, i.e. ηi > maxj. Workers in this condition are
indifferent between any level of skill deployment in the interval [maxj, ηi].
It is now possible to look more formally at the meaning of skill mismatch. In order to do
so, the optimal skill deployment of over- and under-skilled workers should be compared
to the counterfactual of their being well-matched. Importantly, such comparison should
be independent of other matches. In other words, the counterfactual should be viewed
as a move of the mismatched worker to a previously vacant or even non-existent job or,
equivalently, as a transformation of the production function of the job held by the mis-
matched worker. The alternative counterfactual, whereby the mismatched worker takes a
job previously held by someone else, requires considering the effect of such a transition
on the latter worker, thus making it impossible to define skill mismatch as a feature of the
job-worker pair and bringing it nearer to the macro notion of mismatch.
In the simple theory spelled out in this section, jobs are characterized by three param-
eters: the operational costs (kj), the returns to deployed skills (βj) and the maximum skill
level (maxj).11 Hence, in order to become well-matched, any mismatched worker needs
to move to a job with a different combination of these three parameters.
Consider the over-skilled first. In order to be well-matched, they need to find a job h
such that maxh > maxj (j indicating their current jobs), where they would deploy more
skills, as their optimal skill deployment increases from maxj to ηi. Unless the new job is
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also characterized by lower returns to skills (βh < βj), such a transition would also result
into higher output.
As regards the under-skilled, in order to become well-matched, they need to be in a job
h characterized either by lower operational costs (kh < kj) or by higher returns to skills
(βh > βj) or both. In any event, where they are well-matched, they would deploy less skills
but output would be unambiguously higher.
Hence, based on the definitions above, over- and under-skilled workers are mismatched
in the sense that their skills could be more productively used if the structural features of
their jobs were different and such that they would be well-matched.
3.2 Empirical implementation
Having access to data that include observable measures of the skills possessed by
employed workers, as in PIAAC, it is possible to identify and estimate the parameters
minj and maxj for each job, where jobs are defined as occupations or, depending on the
size and quality of the data, as the combination of occupation and industry classes. In
other words, all the jobs in the same class are assumed to be homogeneous, i.e. using the
same production technology.
The identification of job requirements rests on two questions that are asked to
employed respondents in PIAAC but that are also common to other surveys, sometimes
with variations (Allen and van der Velden 2001; Mavromaras et al. 2007; Green andMcIn-
tosh 2007). The first question asks about whether one feels to have the skills to do a more
demanding job. The exact phrasing is the following: “Do you feel that you have the skills
to cope with more demanding duties than those you are required to perform in your cur-
rent job?”. The second question is about the need of training and reads as follows: “Do
you feel that you need further training in order to cope well with your present duties?”.
We assume that respondents who answer negatively to both questions are neither over-
skilled nor under-skilled; hence, they are well-matched. According to our simple theory,
well-matched workers deploy their entire endowment of skills and we can then estimate
minj andmaxj as the minimum and the maximum of their tested skills, respectively:
• m̂inj = minimum level of assessed skills of workers who neither feel they could do a
more demanding job nor feel the need of further training
• m̂axj = maximum level of assessed skills of workers who neither feel they could do a
more demanding job nor feel the need of further training
For the moment, the assumption that selecting workers who answer negatively to
both questions correctly identifies good matches, i.e. job-worker pairs such that ηi ∈
[minj,maxj], is maintained. The obvious concerns about misreporting in such questions
are the object of the next section (Section 3.3).
Now, it is possible to classify under-skilled workers as those whose skill endowments
are belowminj and, similarly, over-skilled workers are those whose skill endowments are
abovemaxj. In Section 5, we produce empirical estimates of such categorization.
Next, an optimal level of skill use can be defined for every worker in the econ-
omy as the skill use observed for workers with a similar level of skill endowments
who are well-matched. Such a comparison is informative about the amount of skills
that are under- or over-utilized. We perform this analysis on the PIAAC data in
Section 6.
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Finally, it is possible to use this theoretical framework to assess the efficiency of the
observed allocation of workers to jobs, the efficiency of the assignment mechanism.
In Section 7, we compare the observed degree of skill mismatch with what would be
observed in an alternative allocation generated by an assignment procedure designed to
minimize over- and under-skilling.
3.3 Misreporting
The use of self-reported information about one’s ability to perform one’s cur-
rent job and one’s need for training may question the validity of the estimates
of the job requirements. Despite not being immune to measurement error and
misreporting, the methodology described in Section 3.2 allows the derivation of
alternative estimators of the job requirements and, by comparing such alternative
n, it also allows producing evidence that is informative about the extent of the
problem.
Specifically, in addition to the estimators described in Section 3.2, minj could alterna-
tively be estimated as the maximum skill endowment of workers who report feeling the
need of further training and not feeling able to do a more demanding job. Similarly,maxj
could be estimated as the minimum skill endowment of workers who report feeling able
to do a more demanding job and not feeling the need for further training.
It is useful to define these alternative estimators as follows:
• m˜inj = maximum skill endowment of workers feeling the need of further training
• m˜axj = minimum skill endowment of workers feeling able to do more demanding
jobs
Figure 4 visually summarizes the intuition behind these estimators, each of which
is affected differently by the most cumbersome sources of mismeasurement, namely
overconfidence and the generalized need for training.
Fig. 4 Alternative estimators of job requirements
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Overconfident respondents might report being capable of doing more demanding jobs
even when they are indeed well-matched or even under-skilled in their current employ-
ment. Interestingly, overconfidence is much more likely to bias m˜axj than m̂axj. In fact, a
single (truly) well-matched worker who is overconfident and consequently reports being
over-skilled crucially changes m˜axj. On the other hand, only if the most skilled worker
among the (truly) well-matched is overconfident m̂axj changes. In practice, one can look
at the magnitude of the difference between m̂axj and m˜axj to assess the importance of
overconfidence in the data.
Overconfidence is less of an issue for the estimation ofminj, as the question about hav-
ing the skills to cope with a more demanding job is not used for this purpose. It does
however remain possible that some overconfident workers who are truly under-skilled
end up being classified as well-matched because they believe that their skills are appro-
priate for their jobs and thus report both not feeling able to do a more demanding job and
not needing training. Hence, our methodology is not completely immune from mismea-
surement induced by overconfidence. Nevertheless, we believe that it is a limited problem
given that workers answering positively to the specific question about being able to do
more demanding jobs are not used by our procedure.
Beside overconfidence, another source of misreporting might affect the respondents’
answers to the question about the need for training, which is the basis for estimating
minj. Such a question specifically asks whether the respondent feels the need of additional
training to “cope well” with her present duties and people may attach different interpreta-
tions to the notion of “coping well,” given that the quality of how tasks are performed can
vary substantially. Hence, some people might answer that they do feel the need of addi-
tional training, under the assumption that with more training, they could carry out their
current tasks better (e.g. more rapidly, less expensively) even though they already do so at
an acceptable level or, in the terminology of our simple theory, they already deploy skills
aboveminj.
It seems reasonable to argue that the bias in m̂inj is likely to be smaller than in m˜inj. This
is because any (truly) well-matched or over-skilled worker whomisinterprets the question
and reports needing training would crucially affect m˜inj. On the other hand, m˜inj is biased
only if the least skilled among the (truly) well-matched reports being in need of training.
An additional, although less worrisome, source of mismeasurement is the heterogeneity
of jobs within occupations (or occupation-industry cells). In fact, despite the theoretical
assumption that all jobs are identical within occupations, some heterogeneity necessar-
ily exists in practice. Hence, in order to reduce its implications on the definition of the
job requirements, it is useful to consider some bottom and top percentiles of the within-
job distributions of workers’ skills rather than the actual minimum and the maximum.
In Section 5, the 95th and 5th percentiles of the within-occupation distribution of skill
endowments among workers who neither feel the need for further training nor feel capa-
ble of doing more demanding jobs are used as estimators of maxj and minj, respectively.
In Section 5.2, we show that our results are robust to the choice of the percentile.
3.4 Skill-specific mismatch
So far, the skill endowment of workers, ηi, has been assumed to be a simple uni-
dimensional variable. However, one major advantage of PIAAC is the availability of
measures of proficiency in three important skill domains, namely numeracy, literacy and
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problem-solving. Hence, it allows producing measures of mismatch that are specific to
each skill, as workers could use all their skills in some domains and be over-skilled or
under-skilled along other dimensions.
In fact, the methodological framework presented in this section can be readily rein-
terpreted in the context of multiple skills. Simply allow ηi to be a vector of several skills
and, similarly, also the job requirements, minj and maxj will be multidimensional vec-
tors. Then, assume workers who report being over/under-skilled do so whenever any
of their skills is above/below the corresponding minimum/maximum requirement, even
if they are well-matched with regard to all the other skill dimensions. Under this addi-
tional assumption, minimum and maximum requirements for each skill type can still be
estimated as discussed in the section above and workers can be classified as under- or
over-skilled by each skill domain.
Of course, the survey cannot cover the entire set of skills that are needed at work so that
some individuals may still be mismatched along some dimensions that are not observed
in the data.
3.5 Extensions
The theoretical framework described above clearly rests on a number of simplifying
assumptions and, although some of them are crucial for the purpose of constructing mea-
sures of skill mismatch that can be implemented empirically, some serve the more modest
purpose of simplifying the model.
For example, in order to make sense of the notions of minimum and maximum require-
ments, it is crucial to define production functions with either kinks or negative intercepts
or both. Similarly, in order to conceptualize separately the endowment of skills and their
deployment, one needs to introduce some costs of deploying one’s endowment into the
job.
However, the sharp assumptions about the return to skills dropping all the way to zero
above maxj and the cost of skill deployment being exactly zero up to one’s endowment
can be relaxed. Specifically, the production and cost functions could very well look as in
Fig. 5 without compromising any of the implications that we derived from the model.
Fig. 5 Alternative production and cost functions
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Provided the marginal cost of skill deployment increases above ηi and the returns to
skills decline beyond maxj, nothing would change substantially in our framework. Only
one additional assumption would be needed regarding the relative ratio of the returns to
skills above and belowmaxj and the marginal costs above and below ηi to avoid unreason-
able and uninteresting equilibria in which, for example, the under-skilled find it optimal
to deploy skills abovemaxj.
Other assumptions that are worth mentioning here are the lack of complementarity of
workers in the production process, the random assignment of workers to jobs and the
limited variation in the sharing parameter γ which is constrained to be constant within
workers across jobs.
Regarding complementarities, it is important to note that skill complementarity can be
very easily incorporated in the model of Section 3.1. The linearity of output with respect
to each specific skill is what makes the identification of job requirements particularly sim-
ple. However, it is still possible to allow the production function in Fig. 3 to shift vertically
in reaction to changing inputs of other skills. The model would still require some addi-
tional assumptions to avoid the minimum and maximum requirements for each skills to
be affected by changes in the inputs of the others, a situation that would make the very
definition of requirements extremely unclear. Hence, skill complementarity does not need
to be totally ruled out, but only some specific forms of complementarity can be incorpo-
rated in the model. In any event, incorporating them would necessarily complicate the
model and make it empirically less tractable.
A similar argument can be made for complementarity across workers, which could be
taken into account, provided it takes forms that still allow defining worker job-specific
requirements. In the current “one worker/one job” formulation, requirements indiffer-
ently refer either to the total input of skills in the production function or to the input
provided by the single worker. With multiple workers contributing to the same produc-
tion function, these two notions of requirements do not coincide and they need to be
defined separately.
Finally, allowing the sharing parameter, γ , to vary both across workers and across jobs
is possible, but it complicates the interpretation of mismatch. One convenient feature of
the current formulation that would be lost if γ varied by job is the very sharp implications
for optimal skill deployment. This is, in part, the result of having jobs and workers being
defined by structural features that do not overlap with one another: workers are charac-
terized by skill endowments (ηi) and jobs by the parameters of the production function
(βj, kj andmaxj). A sharing parameter that varies across both i and j would break this use-
ful separation and make the derivation of both optimal deployment and the implications
of mismatch much less clear.
4 The Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC)
The Survey of Adult Skills is the main output of the Programme for the International
Assessment of Adult Competencies run by the OECD in collaboration with national gov-
ernments and a consortium of experts supporting the implementation of the survey and
the preparation of the data.
The survey is a collection of country-specific samples designed to be representative
of the adult population aged between 16 and 65 years. The samples are constructed
from potentially very different sampling frames but according to harmonized statistical
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procedures aimed at guaranteeing comparability across countries. The same background
questionnaire is administered to all sampled individuals in all the countries, merely
translated in the local language.12
There currently are two rounds of PIIAC data. The first round covers 23 countries
(round 1) and was collected between 2008 and 2013.13 The second round covers 9 coun-
tries (that were not in round 1) andwas collected between 2012 and 2016. In this paper, we
only use the data from round 1 and the descriptive statistics of some key socio-economic
variables are presentedin Table 1.
One key element of PIAAC is the skill assessment exercise that all respondents are
asked to take as part of the interview process. The exercise consists of a set of test ques-
tions organized into three domains: numeracy, literacy and problem-solving. By default,
all three tests are carried out on computers but literacy and numeracy can also be done
on paper for those who prefer to do so and for those who lack basic IT literacy. Problem-
solving can only be taken on computers and those who refuse or cannot use a PC are
simply routed out. As a consequence, the number of missing values in problem-solving
is relatively high in many countries (on average about 10% across all participating coun-
tries but up to over 35% in some). For this reason, the analysis of problem-solving skills is
excluded from this paper.
As it is customary in the design of competency tests (OECD 2012; 2013), not all
respondents are administered all the questions and a purposely designed routing algo-
rithm guides each respondent through a subset of the test items. This procedure allows
reducing the time required to complete the assessment, thus maximising participation.
Then, the entirety of the answers for all respondents in all countries is used to estimate
a psychometric model based on Item Response Theory (IRT) that produces a skill profi-
ciency measure for each participant in the survey with completed information from the
background questionnaire (Ackerman 2010; Jakubowski 2013; Jacob and Rothstein 2016).
The purpose of the IRTmodel is the estimation of the unobservable respondents’ ability
in each domain (literacy, numeracy) using information about their observed performance
in tasks that are associated to such domains. The number of tasks that could be associated
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean St. dev. Min Max
1 = woman 0.480 0.500 0.000 1.000
1 = graduatea 0.431 0.495 0.000 1.000
1 = foreign born 0.102 0.302 0.000 1.000
Age distribution





Total Mean Min Max
Sample sizeb 78,422 3565 1666 15,060
Source: OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC)
aIndividuals with some tertiary education
bTotal is the total size of the sample used for the analysis, across all countries. Mean is the mean sample size across countries. Min
and max are the minimum and maximum sample size across countries
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with each skill is potentially infinite, and only a subset of them can be tested in practice. In
PIAAC, each respondent answers on average 20 questions in literacy and about the same
in numeracy, taking approximately 1 min for each item.
A number of arbitrary assumptions necessarily need to be made in this context. First,
the association of tasks to skills is entirely discretionary and, while reading a text is clearly
a literacy task and summing numbers is clearly a numeracy test, there are numerous
examples of test items that could be associated with several skills.14 Additionally, the the-
ory does not provide guidance about the specific formulation of the IRT model in terms
of both functional form and explanatory variables, and the choice is usually made on the
basis of computational convenience and data quality. PIAAC adopts a logistic model with
two parameters, one reflecting the difficulty of the task and one measuring how well the
task discriminates among respondents along the underlying skill. The resulting estimates
are used to impute an indicator of skill proficiency for each respondent with completed
information on the variables used in the IRT model.
For ease of use and interpretation, the skill indicators are transformed into a scale rang-
ing from 0 to 500. The first two lines of Table 2 report some basic descriptive statistics
for the indicators of proficiency in literacy and numeracy for the pooled sample of all
PIAAC participating countries. The average proficiency is around 277 for literacy and
slightly lower (270) for numeracy. In both cases, the median is higher than the mean, sug-
gesting that the distribution is skewed to the left due to a tail of individuals with very low
scores. Additionally, the distribution of numeracy proficiency appears to be slightly more
dispersed than that of literacy.
The background questionnaire of PIAAC also includes a very detailed section about
the use of skills at work. Participants are asked about the frequency with which they per-
form specific tasks, such as reading documents or making calculations, in the course of
their work activities. This paper focuses on a limited set of such questions to construct
indicators of the use of literacy and numeracy at work.15
The original frequency questions allow respondents to answer on a discrete scale of 5
values: never (1), less than once a month (2), less than once a week but at least once a
month (3), at least once a week but not every day (4) and every day (5). The set of tasks
considered to construct the indicator of literacy use includes reading and writing of a very
wide set of documents.16 The tasks considered for numeracy are also numerous and very
detailed, including making various types of calculations and using calculators.17
This large number of questions is averaged to construct skill use indicators for literacy
and numeracy. This simple procedure remains agnostic about the relative importance of
each task and maintains a rather intuitive interpretation of the resulting scales, where a
value of zero signifies that none of the tasks considered is ever performed and a value of
5 corresponds to performing each of the tasks every day. Basic descriptive statistics for
Table 2 Proficiency and use of literacy and numeracy
Variable Mean Median Std. dev.
Proficiency in literacy 277.735 281.319 46.500
Proficiency in numeracy 270.169 273.998 51.575
Use of literacy 2.663 2.750 0.943
Use of numeracy 2.328 2.167 1.080
Source: OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC)
Pellizzari and Fichen IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2017) 6:1 Page 17 of 30
these indicators are shown in the bottom two lines of Table 2. The mean use of literacy is
around 2.7, which is very close to the median (2.7). Numeracy tasks seem to be performed
slightly less frequently, with a mean use around 2.3.
5 Empirical results
The methodology described in Section 3 is applied to the PIAAC survey, and the main
results are in Tables 3 and 4 for literacy and numeracy, respectively.
Jobs are defined separately for each country on the basis of 2-digit occupational
codes (ISCO 2-digit).18 Due to the small sample sizes, armed forces (ISCO code 0)
are dropped. Furthermore, possible observations with missing two- codes have been
recoded according to their 1-digit occupation. Finally, occupations with fewer than 50
observations (about 3% of the overall sample) are also dropped. In the end, we have
492 country-occupation cells, with a median of 25 occupations per country (mean
is 22). The final working sample is restricted to dependent employees holding only
one job.
The computation of the standard errors for the estimates presented in this section
needs to take into account both the differences in the sampling frames across countries
and the variation induced by the imputation of the ability scores. The Appendix dis-
cusses in details how this is done. Tables 3 and 4 present our main results disaggregated
by country. For brevity, all the following results will be reported pooling all countries
together.19
Considering literacy proficiency, approximately 75% of dependent employees are clas-
sified as well-matched across all the countries covered by the survey, about 16% are
over-skilled and 9% are under-skilled (Table 3). These average results mask a large hetero-
geneity across countries. For example, over-skilling can affect as many as 25% of workers
in Spain and as few as 5.9% in France. Under-skilling is lowest in Austria (2.2%) and
Canada (2.4%) and is highest in Spain (17.1%). The results for numeracy (Table 4) are
broadly similar to those for literacy, and the ranking of countries is also similar. The Spear-
man rank correlation between the incidence of mismatch—i.e. the sum of the under- and
over-skilled—in literacy and in numeracy is equal to 0.55.
In fact, Table 5 shows that 90% of the workers who are well-matched in literacy are also
well-matched in numeracy. The overlap is less strong but still very important among the
under- and the over-skilled.
Table 6 describes the incidence of under- and over-skilling across socio-demographic
groups. Men appear to be affected by over-skilling more frequently than women, both
with regard to literacy and numeracy, whereas gender differences in under-skilling are
minor. This result is not obvious, as one may think that women, who often find employ-
ment more difficultly than men, might be more willing to take jobs that do not necessarily
match their skills perfectly. On the other hand, (OECD 2013a) shows that women use
their skills less frequently than men, mostly because of the jobs in which they are occu-
pied. Being in jobs where skills are not often used, they might also be less likely to be
mismatched.
As one might expect, graduate workers are less likely to be under-skilled than non-
graduates. They are also more likely to be over-skilled (Quintini 2011a; 2011b; OECD
2013a). Literacy and numeracy follow similar patterns. All these differences are statisti-
cally significant at the 5% level.
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Table 5 Overlapping of skill mismatch in literacy and numeracy
Numeracy
Under-skilled Well-matched Over-skilled
Literacy Under-skilled 0.652 0.305 0.043
(0.017) (0.016) (0.008)
Well-matched 0.033 0.894 0.073
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Over-skilled 0.016 0.313 0.671
(0.005) (0.015) (0.014)
Shares of workers who are under-skilled, well-matched or over-skilled in numeracy by mismatch status in literacy. The numbers
sum to 1 by rows. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. See Appendix for details on the bootstrap procedure. Source:
OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC)
Consistent with the higher educational achievement of the younger generations, older
workers are more likely to be under-skilled and less likely to be over-skilled, in both liter-
acy and numeracy. This result also conformswith the idea that younger workers need time
to experiment andmove across jobs in search of what fits their skills well (Topel andWard
1992). As for older workers, the presence of a non-negligible share of over-skilled might
be interpreted as an encouraging finding, especially for those countries facing rapidly age-
ing populations, as it suggests that improving the matching of older workers may help
mitigate the impact of population ageing on productivity.
Finally, foreign workers are twice more likely than natives to be under-skilled in either
literacy or numeracy. The incidence of over-skilling in numeracy (literacy) is 70% (40%)
larger for foreigners than natives. This result is easy to rationalize for literacy, given that
in most cases, the language of the destination country is different from migrants’ mother
Table 6 Skill mismatch by socio-demographic groups
Literacy Numeracy
Under-skilled Over-skilled Under-skilled Over-skilled
Men 0.095 0.184 0.081 0.201
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Women 0.090 0.138 0.094 0.131
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Non-graduates 0.106 0.132 0.102 0.139
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Graduates 0.076 0.202 0.068 0.204
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Age <45 0.083 0.186 0.080 0.185
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Age ≥45 0.108 0.125 0.098 0.139
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Natives 0.082 0.169 0.078 0.172
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Foreigners 0.183 0.100 0.171 0.121
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Shares of under- and over-skilled workers. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. See Appendix for details on the bootstrap
procedure. Source: OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC)
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tongues. For numeracy, the lower incidence of over-skilling contrasts with the common
finding that immigrants often hold formal educational qualifications that are higher than
those required by their jobs. The over-qualification of migrants is often attributed to
the difficulties in having educational qualifications officially recognized across countries.
However, the results in Table 6 seem to suggest that some of the over-qualified foreigners
simply do not have the necessary skills to carry out their jobs satisfactorily, pointing to a
large heterogeneity in the quality of schooling across countries.
5.1 Comparison with other measures of skill mismatch
As we already discussed in Section 2, we are certainly not the first to measure skill
mismatch and a variety of methodologies have been already proposed in the literature.
In Fig. 6, we show the distribution of skill mismatch for the pooled PIAAC sample
obtained using the two most popular approaches to measuring it. The left panel of Fig. 6
shows the percentages of under-skilled, well-matched and over-skilled based on the fully
self-reported approach, which only makes use of the self-reported answers to the ques-
tions about needing training and feeling capable of doing more demanding jobs. The
under-skilled are those who report needing training, the over-skilled are those who report
feeling capable of doing more demanding jobs and the well-matched are those answering
negatively to both questions. Applying this method to the PIAAC data shows that a large
82% are classified as over-skilled, suggesting that overconfidence might actually be a very
common attitude. An additional problem with this method is that a sizeable fraction of
workers report both needing training and feeling able to do more demanding tasks. In the
pooled PIAAC sample, this group represents a good one fourth of all employed workers.
































































Fig. 6 Comparison with other measures of skill mismatch
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The right panel of Fig. 6 shows results obtained with the statistical or realised-
match approach for numeracy mismatch. This approach proceeds by first computing
the median observed skill of workers employed in each occupation, and then, it defines
minimum and maximum requirements in each occupation by, respectively, adding
and subtracting one standard deviation to the median. Workers are classified as well-
matched if their observed skills are within a one standard deviation interval around
the median, they are under-skilled if their skills are below the median minus one stan-
dard deviation and they are over-skilled if they are above the median plus one standard
deviation.
Results indicate that according to this method, about two thirds of the workers are well-
matched and the remaining one third is rather equally divided between under-skilled and
over-skilled. In fact, this result is a direct consequence of the normality of the distribution
of the skill scores, which is imposed by item response theory, the methodology used to
compute them.
5.2 Robustness checks
Our mismatch indicator is based on the minimum and maximum skill requirements
by occupations, which are estimated as the minimum (m̂inj) and maximum (m̂axj) of
the country-occupation distribution of proficiency for those workers who report nei-
ther feeling the need of training nor feeling to be able to do more demanding jobs.
As discussed in Section 3.3, the same requirements could also be estimated as the
maximum proficiency level of workers who report feeling the need of training (m˜inj)
and the minimum proficiency of workers who feel they can do a more demanding
job (m˜axj). However, the first set of estimators (m̂inj and m̂axj) is preferred because
it is more robust to the most common sources of misreporting, such as respondents’
overconfidence and the misinterpretation of the question about needing training. Com-
paring these alternative estimators can, therefore, provide an indication of the extent of
mismeasurement.
Table 7 performs such a comparison. The table reports the average absolute (columns
1 and 3) and percentage (columns 2 and 4) difference between these alternative esti-
mators across all the country-occupation cells. Results show that the two sets of esti-
mates are massively different, thus emphasizing the importance of deriving indicators
of mismatch that take misreporting into careful consideration. On average, across all
occupations and countries, m˜inj is approximately 67% larger than m̂inj for literacy and
Table 7 Alternative estimates of the skill requirements
m˜inj − m̂inja m˜inj−m̂injm̂inj m˜axj − m̂axj
b m˜axj−m̂axj
m̂axj
Literacy 126.04 0.669 −116.36 −0.365
(1.533) (0.013) (1.235) (0.004)
Numeracy 140.95 0.852 −111.74 −0.350
(1.608) (0.036) (1.349) (0.004)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. See Appendix for details on the bootstrap procedure. All figures are averages over
occupational categories and countries. Source: OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC)
am̂inj = the 5th percentile of the proficiency distribution of workers not feeling able to do more demanding jobs nor feeling the
need of training (by occupation). m˜inj = the 95th percentile of the proficiency distribution of workers feeling the need of further
training
bm̂axj = the 95th percentile of the proficiency distribution of workers not feeling able to do more demanding jobs nor feeling the
need of training. m˜axj = the 5th percentile of the proficiency distribution of workers feeling able to do more demanding jobs
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85% larger for numeracy. m˜axj is approximately 35% times smaller than m̂axj in both
skill domains. These findings indicate that using the pure self-reported information to
define skill-mismatch would lead to classify workers as over-skilled even if their assessed
proficiency levels are very often below those of the self-reported well-matched or even
under-skilled.
In Table 8, we investigate the stability of our results to another important param-
eter of our methodology, namely the specific choice of the estimators of m̂inj and
m̂axj. For our main results, we use the 5th and 95th percentiles of the skill distri-
butions, and in Table 8, we report results obtained under alternative choices, namely
the actual minimum and maximum, the 1st and 99th percentiles and the 2nd and
98th percentiles. We find that our main findings are very robust across all these
alternatives.
6 Themisuse of skills
According to the theoretical framework of Section 3.1, workers who are well-matched
are the only ones who fully deploy their skill endowments. The over-skilled are indif-
ferent between deploying any amount of skills between the maximum required by
their jobs and their entire endowments. The under-skilled need to stretch the deploy-
ment of their skills to reach the minimum required by their jobs. These theoretical
implications can now be readily taken to the PIAAC data, where together with infor-
mation about skill endowments, respondents are also asked about their use of skills
at work.
For eachmismatchedworker (either under- or over-skilled), it is possible to compare the
use of skills with well-matched workers at their same level of proficiency and in the same
country. Table 9 shows that, on average, across countries, the indicator of literacy use at
work for individuals who are under-skilled in literacy is about 16.3% higher than the cor-
responding indicator for similarly proficient workers who are well-matched, suggesting
that they do actually over-use their skills. Consistent with the large overlap of mismatch
across skill domains (see Table 5), literacy under-skilled workers also appear to over-use
their numeracy at work (11.1% more than the well-matched). Notice that the over-usage
Table 8 Skill mismatch under alternative thresholds for job requirements
Literacy Numeracy
Under- Well- Over- Under- Well- Over-
skilled matched skilled skilled matched skilled
Min–maxa 0.087 0.763 0.150 0.082 0.762 0.156
(0.078) (0.153) (0.086) (0.075) (0.156) (0.090)
1st–99thb 0.087 0.762 0.151 0.082 0.761 0.157
(0.077) (0.152) (0.085) (0.075) (0.155) (0.090)
2nd–98thc 0.088 0.760 0.152 0.082 0.760 0.158
(0.076) (0.148) (0.083) (0.074) (0.151) (0.087)
5th–95thd 0.093 0.746 0.162 0.087 0.746 0.167
(0.072) (0.133) (0.073) (0.070) (0.137) (0.079)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. See Appendix for details on the bootstrap procedure. Source: OECD Survey of Adult
Skills (PIAAC)
aSkill requirements estimated as the minimum and maximum skills of the self-reported well-matched
bSkill requirements estimated as the 1st and 99th percentiles of the skill distribution of the self-reported well-matched
cSkill requirements estimated as the 2nd and 98th percentiles of the skill distribution of the self-reported well-matched
dSkill requirements estimated as the 5th and 95th percentiles of the skill distribution of the self-reported well-matched
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Table 9 Skill mismatch and the use of skills at work
Literacy mismatch Numeracy mismatch
Over-use of Over-use of Over-use of Over-use of
literacya numeracya literacya numeracya
Under-skilled 0.163 0.064 0.111 0.097
(0.012) (0.015) (0.008) (0.019)
Well-matched – 0.002 0.003 –
(0.001) (0.001)
Over-skilled −0.053 −0.010 −0.031 −0.017
(0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. See Appendix for details on the bootstrap procedure. Source: OECD Survey of Adult
Skills (PIAAC)
aRelative difference between the average usage of the indicated category and the well-matched, conditional on proficiency
of skills by the under-skilled is not necessarily an efficient outcome, since they could be
more productive, while at the same time exerting less effort and being less stressed, if they
were better matched.20
Over-skilling is associated with a substantial waste of skills, as workers who are over
skilled in literacy appear to use their skills at work substantially less than similarly pro-
ficient workers who are well-matched, namely 5.3% lower usage of literacy and 1% lower
usage of numeracy. Looking at mismatch in numeracy shows very similar findings.
A further natural development of the analysis in this section would be the computation
of the output loss associated with the misuse of skills. However, such an exercise requires
causal estimates of the skill-output gradient, whose identification goes beyond the scope
of this paper and is left to future research. A similar and equally interesting analysis could
be extended to some indicator of welfare or health so as to incorporatemore appropriately
the potential negative effects of under-skilling on workers well-being.
7 The efficiency of the assignmentmechanism
In this section, we propose a simple empirical exercise to assess the efficiency of the
assignment of workers to jobs that is observed in the data. Such an exercise consists
in reallocating the individuals in our data to the existing jobs according to an artificial
assignment mechanism designed to reduce skill mismatch.We perform this reassignment
separately for each skill (numeracy and literacy) and on the basis of the skill endowments
of the individuals and the skill requirements of the jobs that are observed in the data
(i.e. those filled with an employed worker). Hence, we do not attempt to solve the com-
plex problem of finding the optimal allocation of jobs and workers, most notably because
we do not have a measure of output nor causal estimates of the skill-output gradients
by literacy and numeracy. Moreover, the exercise we perform in this section takes the
current stock of jobs as given and does not consider new jobs that could potentially be
created thanks to the more efficient assignment mechanism. Similarly, we also take the
skill requirements of the existing jobs as given, and we do not endogenize the potential
effect of better assignment on the characteristics of the jobs.
Despite all these limitations, we believe that the results in this section can be use-
ful to show whether and by how much the observed degree of skill mismatch could
be reduced by reallocating workers to jobs according to some reasonable and easily
implementable procedure. Additionally, these results illustrate the important connection
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between our approach and themacro-literature on assignment models. As we already dis-
cussed in Section 3.1, our model can be viewed as a framework to produce measures of
the efficiency of the assignment mechanism when data about workers’ skills are available.
We perform three different reassignment exercises. First, we consider only employed
workers and the skill requirements of the jobs they occupy. Then, we reallocate workers to
jobs by assigning the least skilled worker to the job with the lowest minimum requirement
and the most skilled worker to the job with the highest maximum requirement; next, we
assign the second least skilled worker to the job with the second lowest minimum require-
ment and the second most skilled worker to the job with the second highest maximum
requirement and so on until all jobs are filled with a worker. The assignment procedure is
carried out country-by-country and replicated separately for literacy and numeracy.
The second row of Table 10 reports the distribution of skill mismatch associated with
the resulting assignment. For comparison purposes, the first row of the table reports
the distribution of skill mismatch observed in the real data, namely the same estimates
reported in Tables 3 and 4.21
Focusing on the results for literacy, we find that this relatively simple reassignment
procedure increases the share of well-matched workers from 74.6 to 90%, an increase of
over 20%. This effect is generated mostly by a reduction of the incidence of over-skilling
that goes from 16.2 to 1.6%. The contraction of under-skilling is more modest: from 9.3
to 8.4%. When the reallocation is performed on numeracy, the results are similar to the
notable exception that now, under-skilling increases slightly. Overall, these findings sug-
gest that there is not a major lack of highly skilled individuals among the employed but
rather a misallocation of them to the the existing jobs. On the other hand, there seems
to be a certain lack of skill towards the bottom of the distribution and some jobs with
relatively highminimum requirements remain filled with insufficiently skilled individuals.
The second reassignment exercise that we perform is similar to the previous one with
the exception that we now consider also the unemployed among the pool of workers to be
reallocated to the existing jobs.We then have more workers than jobs, and we start select-
ing out those with skill endowments above the highest maximum requirement observed
in the country or below the lowest minimum requirement. In any possible assignment,
these workers would certainly be either under- or over-skilled. Then, we apply our usual
reassignment algorithm to allocate the remaining workers to the existing jobs. Results
are reported in the third row of Table 10 and indicate that now, both under-skilling and
Table 10 Skill mismatch under alternative assignment mechanisms
Literacy Numeracy
Under- Well- Over- Under- Well- Over-
skilled matched skilled skilled matched skilled
Observeda 0.093 0.746 0.162 0.087 0.746 0.167
Re-assign Eb 0.084 0.900 0.016 0.095 0.897 0.008
Re-assign E+Uc 0.044 0.931 0.024 0.045 0.924 0.032
Re-assign E+U+Id 0.021 0.899 0.080 0.032 0.904 0.065
Source: OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC)
aObserved distribution of skill-mismatch (same as in Tables 3 and 4)
bDistribution of skill mismatch obtained by reallocating employed workers to the existing jobs. See Section 7 for details
cDistribution of skill mismatch obtained by reallocating employed and unemployed workers to the existing jobs. See Section 7 for
details
dDistribution of skill mismatch obtained by reallocating all individuals (employed, unemployed and inactive) to the existing jobs.
See Section 7 for details
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over-skilling are reduced compared to the observed allocation and the share of jobs filled
with a well-matched worker reaches 93.1% for literacy and 92.4% for numeracy. Notice,
however, that compared to re-assigning only the employed workers (the second row of the
table), the incidence of over-skilling increases. This result can be easily explained by the
fact that there is now a larger pool of individuals that can fill the jobs with low minimum
requirements and, therefore, there are more skilled individuals available to be assigned
to the more demanding jobs. In addition, there also is a non-negligible share of relatively
highly skilled individuals among the unemployed, especially women.
A similar but more pronounced patter can be observed in the last row of Table 10,
where we report the results of our last reassignment exercise. In this case, we consider
all individuals in our data, namely all the employed, unemployed and inactive. As before,
we drop those with endowments below the lowest minimum requirement and above the
highest maximum requirement and we apply the reassignment algorithm to the remain-
ing ones. Now, there are enough individuals to fill most jobs with a sufficiently competent
worker: the incidence of under-skilling goes down to 2.1% when the reassignment is based
on literacy and to 3.2% when done on numeracy. However, this also implies that there
are now more skilled workers available to fill more demanding jobs, both because they do
not have to be allocated to less demanding jobs and also because there some very skilled
individuals among the inactive, again especially women. As a consequence, the share of
over-skilling increases compared to the other reassignment exercises (but still decreases
compared to the observed data).
Overall, the results of this section indicate that the observed skill mismatch in the
pooled PIAAC countries is mostly due to an allocative problem rather than to the short-
age of certain skills in the population. Simply reallocating those currently employed to
the current existing jobs reduces skill mismatch substantially, to an overall level of around
10% (counting both under- and over-skilling), which can probably be considered a rea-
sonable structural level. In terms of policy implications, it seems thus more effective to
focus on policies aimed at improving the quality of the matching process rather than to
those aimed at modifying the skill composition of labour supply (educational choices). Of
course, our analysis does not capture those jobs that might remain vacant or simply not
exist because of mismatch and skill shortages might have an effect along this dimension.
8 Conclusions
This paper proposes a novel measure of skill mismatch for the recent PIAAC data. This
newmeasure allows classifying workers into under-skilled, well-matched and over-skilled
along the skill domains of literacy and numeracy. The novelty lies mostly in the develop-
ment of a theory-based procedure to identify jobs’ requirements from data on workers in
the absence of direct information about the production process.
On average, across the entire pooled sample, approximately 75% of dependent employ-
ees are well-matched in the literacy domain, about 9% are under-skilled and 16% are
over-skilled. The overlap between literacy and numeracy mismatch is substantial: 90% of
the workers who are well-matched in literacy are also well-matched in numeracy.
Men are more likely to be over-skilled than women, whereas gender differences in
under-skilling are minor. Tertiary graduates are substantially less likely to be under-
skilled than less educated workers, and they are more likely to be over-skilled. Foreign
workers are substantially more likely to be under-skilled and substantially less likely to
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be over-skilled. Differences emerge also when looking across age groups. Furthermore,
we show that skill mismatch is associated with a substantial degree of skill over- and
under-utilization, with potential sizeable implications in terms of output loss and workers’
well-being. We also perform a series of reassignment exercises, and we find indications
that skill mismatch can be substantially reduced by efficiently reallocating workers to jobs.
Despite being mostly illustrative of the methodology, these findings have important
implications for policy. A better match of the workers’ skills to the requirements of their
jobs can reduce the waste of skills among the over-skilled, improve the efficiency of the
under-skilled while, at the same time, potentially reducing their levels of stress and, even-
tually, lead to important improvements of the overall productivity of the economy and the
well-being of individuals.
Endnotes
1 The indicator of skill mismatch described in this paper is officially adopted by the
OECD in the context of the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Com-
petencies (PIAAC), of which the Survey of Adult Skills is a key element, and hereafter, it
will be labelled OECDmeasure of skill mismatch. For simplicity, the acronym PIAAC will
be used in this paper to refer to both the overall programme and the survey. Some of the
results reported here differ from those in (OECD 2013a) because the latter uses a slightly
richer version of the data whose access is restricted. In this paper, we use the publicly
available data files and our results are fully replicable.
2 These are workers who report that they do not feel they “have the skills to cope with
more demanding duties than those they are required to perform in their current job” and
they do not feel they “need further training in order to cope well with their present duties.”
3 The distributions are constructed using the same sample of our main analysis in
Section 5. The qualification requirements of the jobs are self-reported by the survey
respondents.
4 International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), Trends in International Mathematics and
Science Study (TIMSS), Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), Adult
Literacy and Lifeskills (ALL).
5 In their recent work, (van der Velden and Bijlsma 2016) take amore practical approach
and investigate how different combinations of skill use and skill endowment indicators
correlate with wages.
6 It is fair to also acknowledge that there are important features of the efficiency of an
assignment mechanism that our measure does not necessarily capture very well, such as
the efficiency of the allocation of workers between employment and non-employment.
7 In this framework one might also incorporate an analysis of qualification mismatch by
simply defining qualifications as a discretization of skills.
8 The subscript i to the function c(·) indicates that the function itself varies with ηi,
which, in fact, determines the point where the slope of the function changes.
9 This assumption can be easily justified in the context of search&matching models that
have become the standard view of the functioning of the labour market. In the standard
version of such models, the equilibrium wage is equal to a fraction of the job’s output plus
the outside option of the worker. Further, assuming that the worker’s outside option is
itself a fraction of the wage (as in most unemployment insurance systems) leads precisely
to an expression of the equilibrium wage as a fraction of productivity.
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10Allowing the sharing parameter γ to vary across jobs (or both across workers and
jobs) is possible, but it makes it less obvious to formalize a meaningful definition of skill
mismatch.
11 The minimum skill requirement (minj) can be easily and uniquely derived from the
triplet [ kj,βj, maxj], i.e. for each [ kj,βj,maxj], there exists one and only oneminj.
12 In a few countries, the survey is administered in multiple languages.
13 The data for Australia are not included in the set of public use files and are therefore
excluded from our analysis. Hence, we cover only 22 countries.
14Notice that the same item can be used to estimate more than one skill measure.
15 (OECD 2013a) analyses a larger set of skill use indicators.
16Directions, instructions, memos, letters, e-mails, articles (in newspapers, magazines,
newsletters, professional and scholarly journals), books, manuals and referencematerials,
bills, invoices, financial statements, diagrams, maps and schematics.
17Calculating prices, costs or budgets; calculating fractions, decimals or percentages;
using a calculator; preparing charts, graphs or tables; using algebra or formulas; using
advanced mathematics (calculus), trigonometry, statistics, regression techniques.
18 For four countries (Austria, Canada, Estonia and Finland), only 1-digit occupational
categories are available in the public use files.
19 Results by country are available from the authors upon request.
20 By construction, the degree of over-use of literacy for those who are well-matched in
literacy is zero, similar to numeracy.
21We do not report standard errors in Table 10 because it is unclear what would be the
underlying source of variation when the allocation is generated by an ad hoc assignment
procedure.
22 PIAAC also provides a sequence of replicate weights that can be used to assess the
sampling variability (OECD 2013). However, it is not obvious how to use them with com-
plex estimation procedures such as the derivation of the skill mismatch indicators and the
related statistics. Moreover, additional adjustments would still be needed to take proper
account for the imputation of the skill measurements.
23 To reduce the size of the resulting datasets, all sampling weights have been divided
by the minimum weight in the country so that each sampled unit is represented at least
once and, at the same time, all relative weights remain unchanged.
24 Performing correct bootstrapping without expanding the sample would require
knowledge of the details of the sampling process in each county, namely stratification
units, primary and secondary units, etc. Unfortunately, this information is not provided
in PIAAC (and the replicate weights are meant to replace it) for two sets of reasons.
First, the sampling structures of the country samples are sometimes quite different. For
example, in some cases, the original sampling frame is a standard population regis-
ter whereas in other instances, data are originally drawn from administrative archives.
As a consequence, providing complete information about the sampling structure in a
compact and comparable format across all countries is problematic. The second rea-
son is related to the various confidentiality norms present in each participating country,
many of which would be breached by the full disclosure of all the sampling information
(OECD 2013).
25Any plausible value could have been used, and the resulting point estimates would
have the exact same asymptotic properties.
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Appendix
Inference
In order to make correct inference about the mismatch indicators reported in Section 5,
it is necessary to take into proper account both the sample variability and the imputed
nature of the skill measures (OECD 2013).
Taking proper account for the sampling variability is a particularly important issue in
PIAAC, given the different nature of the country samples. Although harmonized pro-
tocols guarantee the comparability of results, PIAAC remains a collection of country
surveys, each of which has been constructed independently. Each country sample comes
with a sampling weight that indicates the number of units in the target population repre-
sented by each sampled unit. Such a weight summarizes all the necessary information to
obtain point estimates that are representative of the target population.22
In order to compute asymptotically valid standard errors around the estimates pre-
sented in the main text, the following procedure has been adopted. First, each sampled
unit is identically replicated a number of times equal to its sampling weight (rounded
to the closest integer), so as to generate a sample that replicates the full target popula-
tion.23The resulting expanded datasets are fully representative of the target populations
and can be used to extract sequences of S bootstrapped samples of the same size of the
original country samples. The entire analysis is then repeated on each bootstrapped sam-
ple resulting in a sequence of S estimates for each of the statistics presented in Sections 5
and 6. The empirical distribution of such statistics is then used to compute standard errors
that are asymptotically valid by construction.24
As it is now common practice with IRT-derived measures of psychometric traits,
a series of plausible values for each trait is provided. In the specific case of the
OECD SAS, ten plausible values for each of the three skills considered (literacy,
numeracy and problem solving) are available. Each of them is an equally good proxy
of the underlying unobservable psychometric construct; however, each of them is a
noisy proxy and the dispersion across the plausible values reflect measurement error
(OECD 2013; Mislevy 1993a; 1993b). All the point estimates presented in the main
text are constructed using one such plausible values for literacy and for numeracy
(the first).25
In the bootstrapping procedure described above, at each replication, one randomly
selected plausible value is used to proxy skills (one plausible value for literacy and one
for numeracy), so as to incorporate in the resulting sequence of estimates the additional
variability induced by the imputed nature of the measurements.
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